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Abstract 
We investigate the effects of regulatory restrictions on the amounts invested in risky asset classes in life insurance funds 
across EU countries. By estimating a panel data econometric model, we find that these restrictions have an economically and 
statistically significant negative impact on risk-adjusted returns of approximately 1-2 percentage points, holding constant 
other relevant factors. The use of explicit limits on asset allocation can be a blunt instrument for regulating risk-taking, in 
that they impede investment managers’ ability to exploit the benefits of portfolio diversification, and thus distort portfolio 
selection below the efficient frontier. We also find that those countries which impose the most stringent constraints tend to 
experience the largest efficiency losses. Furthermore, our results suggest that firms subject to prescriptive regulation are less 
able to respond quickly under conditions of financial market turbulence. Our results are robust to inclusion of additional 
controls, tests for fixed effects and country-specific heterogeneity, and other robustness checks. 
Keywords: Financial regulation; asset allocation; portfolio risk diversification; life insurance funds. 
JEL classification: G11, G22, G28. 
1. Introduction 
In this paper, we investigate the effects of regulatory requirements which restrict the amount 
invested in risky asset classes in life insurance investment portfolios. The recent global 
financial crisis has highlighted the importance of financial regulation, with many 
commentators arguing that the combined effects of excessive risk-taking by financial 
institutions and a “light touch” approach to regulation contributed significantly to the crisis 
(see, for example, the US Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, 2011), resulting in severe and long-
lasting effects on the real economy (Bijapur, 2010, 2012). Although the potential benefits of 
constraining investment in risky assets have received much attention in the policy debate, the 
motivation for our paper is to investigate the potential costs. We undertake a panel data 
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 econometric analysis of returns on life insurance funds across seven European countries. 
Comparing countries which impose caps on risky asset class investments with those which do 
not, we find evidence of a significant efficiency loss and estimate that these restrictions have 
an economically and statistically significant negative impact on risk-adjusted returns, 
controlling for other relevant factors. 
The intuition behind our results is grounded in the well-known principles of Markowitz 
(1952) portfolio theory. In unconstrained portfolio choice, investment managers choose 
portfolios of assets which maximize expected return for a target level of risk, i.e. those which 
lie on the efficient frontier. The imposition of regulations which constrain the amount 
investable in certain risky asset classes may prevent managers from constructing optimal 
portfolios and fully exploiting the benefits of diversification which arise through weak or 
negative correlations between different asset classes. This can distort portfolio choice below 
the efficient frontier.1 For example, regulators might impose a cap on the proportion invested 
in equities or, alternatively, a floor on the proportion invested in government bonds, with the 
objective of limiting the riskiness of asset portfolios. However, this approach fails to take 
advantage of the weak historical correlation between equities and bonds (see, for example, 
Brown and Reilly, 2012), such that a balanced portfolio combining both asset classes would 
enable a reduction in overall portfolio risk whilst achieving equivalent or higher returns. Put 
differently, firms subject to regulatory limits would achieve lower expected returns, holding 
constant the level of risk. In a similar vein, a ban on investment in foreign currency assets 
with a view to minimizing exchange rate risk might be counter-productive, as it prevents 
managers from exploiting the more than offsetting benefits of international diversification 
which arise due to imperfect correlations between different countries’ securities markets 
(Reilly and Wright, 2004). 
The focus of this paper is on the effects of regulation on the performance of life insurance 
investment funds. The reason for this choice of market is that there exists explicit 
heterogeneity in the type of regulation applied across EU countries, which makes for an 
interesting natural experiment on the effects of asset allocation restrictions on portfolio 
efficiency. More specifically, the system of regulation applied to portfolios of assets covering 
                                               
1 Even in countries which do not impose restrictions on asset allocation, investment managers’ portfolio choices 
will generally be subject to a series of other constraints (liquidity needs, time horizon, tax concerns, unique 
preferences (Brown and Reilly, 2012). However, the objective of our paper is to test whether the effects of 
regulatory constraints decrease portfolio efficiency, holding constant all other constraints. 
 insurance firms’ liabilities across EU member states consists of two distinct approaches: 
Quantitative Restrictions (QR) and the Prudent Person Rule (PPR)2. QR aims to limit 
portfolio risk by imposing explicit caps on the proportion of total funds that an insurance firm 
is permitted to invest in specific risky asset classes (for example, an upper limit of 30 per cent 
in equities, or 10 per cent in foreign currency assets, or an outright ban on investment in 
derivatives). In contrast, the PPR regime entails quite a different approach to regulation, it 
does not impose explicit restrictions on asset allocation, but merely requires that managers 
invest “prudently” and follow broad principles of portfolio diversification and asset-liability 
matching. In practice, this is enforced not through explicit monitoring of portfolio 
composition, but through ensuring that the appropriate internal controls and governance 
structures are in place3. 
We build on Davis (2001), who undertakes a cross-country comparison of aggregate returns 
in PPR and QR countries, extending his work in three key respects. First, whereas Davis uses 
macroeconomic data (weighting the relevant security market indices by the aggregate 
proportions invested in each asset class in each country), we use actual fund returns from a 
sample of 373 life insurance firms. Second, we adjust for risk by estimating Sharpe ratios for 
each fund. This is necessary in order to distinguish whether higher returns in PPR countries 
are driven by a preference for greater risk-taking relative to QR countries, i.e. movements 
along the efficient frontier, or reflect the inability of QR countries to manage risk effectively 
by fully exploiting the benefits of portfolio diversification, thus forcing them below the 
efficient frontier. 
Third, we estimate a panel data econometric model which controls for sources of 
heterogeneity in fund returns other than the impact of regulation, including firm size, 
country-specific market returns and volatilities, and the possibility of unobserved firm-
                                               
2 Regulation of the insurance industry is required due to the existence of two types of market failure, first, the 
presence of asymmetric information between insurance firms and consumers, and second, the existence of 
externalities from insolvency of insurance firms, which can be quite considerable (as highlighted by the US 
government 2008 bailout of the insurance conglomerate AIG). Insurance firms across EU member states are 
currently subject to the Solvency I regime of prudential regulation, which stipulates capital requirements in 
order to reduce the risk of insurer insolvency and thereby protect policyholders and support market stability. In 
addition to this, most countries supplement solvency capital requirements by regulating the portfolio of assets 
covering firms' liabilities. 
3 The EU Solvency I regime also imposes concentration limits on insurance firms, i.e. limits on the proportion of 
total funds which can be invested in any individual security. However, these requirements are applied uniformly 
across Member States, hence we do not focus on these rules, given that the lack of heterogeneity makes it 
impossible to isolate their effects on fund performance. 
 specific or country-specific heterogeneity. Finally, we conduct a series of robustness checks, 
including additional controls and testing for structural breaks and survivorship bias, and find 
that the broad flavor of our results continues to hold. 
Some other relevant papers in the existing literature are discussed here. Del Guercio (1996) 
presents evidence that the “Prudent-Man” regulation of US pension funds distorts portfolio 
choice towards high quality “prudent” stocks. However, whereas she focuses on individual 
stock selection, our concern is with asset allocation. Chen et al. (2007) find that insurance 
company mutual funds tend to underperform non-insurance mutual funds, but attribute this 
not to the effects of regulation, but rather to aggravation of agency problems. Cheng et al. 
(2011) investigate the impact of the Prudent-Man rule on the relationship between risk taking 
of life-health insurers and stability of their institutional owners. Davis (1988) investigates the 
effects of portfolio regulations in impeding portfolio adjustment to short-term market 
conditions. However, his focus is on “tactical asset allocation”, whereas our main focus is on 
the relationship between asset allocation and portfolio diversification. Baranoff and Sager 
(2009) also investigate asset allocation of life insurers, but their focus is on the effects of 
active vs. passive management strategies on investment performance, as opposed to the 
specific impacts of regulation which we look at. Danielsson et al. (2004) show that risk 
regulation can have other unintended consequences, different to those which we explore, due 
to feedback effects which exacerbate short-term asset price volatility. Several other papers 
focus on the effects of capital regulation on insolvency risk in insurance firms (Butsic, 1994; 
Pasiouras and Gaganis, 2009; Shim, 2010), as opposed to the rules on asset allocation which 
we focus on. 
The structure of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe data issues and 
present descriptive statistics. In Section 3, we discuss our risk-adjustment techniques, present 
the panel data econometric model and discuss our choice of estimation methods. In Section 4, 
we present and discuss our results. In Section 5, we summarize our conclusions and discuss 
policy implications. 
 2. Data issues 
Our sample consists of seven European Union countries, five of which use QR regulation, 
whilst the remaining two adopt the PPR approach (this information is based on Davis 
(2001)). The restrictions mostly apply to limits on equities, real estate and foreign assets. All 
countries (including PPR regimes) also specify limits on self-investment. We give details of 
the limits on equity investment in each country in Table 1 below. Our sample of countries is 
limited due to lack of data availability. Although it would be desirable to have a larger 
sample in order to isolate the effects of regulation with greater precision, the advantage of our 
smaller selection of countries is that they are fairly homogeneous in many respects other than 
the type of portfolio regulation in place, thus facilitating our task of controlling for country-
specific effects which might affect investment returns and are potentially correlated with the 
regulation variable. For instance, portfolio regulation is only one aspect of regulation which 
affects the insurance industry, however, this is less of a concern for us given that all countries 
in our sample are bound by the same EU minimum requirements on solvency regulation. 
Furthermore, there exists a degree of harmonization in tax regimes across the EU, which 
mitigates the problem of controlling for variation in investment returns due to differential tax 
treatments. 
All firm-level data is taken from Standard & Poor's Eurothesys database, which provides 
financial statements data for life insurance firms across OECD countries, denominated in 
euros. Our estimation sample consists of annual data from 1996-2004, and is an unbalanced 
panel, with many firms missing observations for the earlier or later part of the time series 
(due to entry and exit of firms, and mergers and acquisitions). In total, we include 373 firms, 
with reasonable coverage across all countries, although the UK and Germany have a larger 
coverage of firms than other countries. The sample includes both public companies and 
mutuals, although there is no bias towards either type of organization in QR or PPR 
countries. For consistency, we use book values of assets in constructing the investment 
portfolios, as market values were unavailable for a large proportion of the sample. 
The dataset required extensive data-cleaning, the main reason for this being that many firms 
do not report information on all asset categories. The full set of asset classes reported 
includes equities, bonds, real estate, loans, cash/bank deposits and derivatives. Data on 
derivatives is very patchy, so we exclude this asset class entirely. Given that equities and 
 bonds are the major investment categories, we exclude any firms which omit information on 
either of these. However, firms not reporting real estate holdings are retained, given that it is 
plausible that many firms will not invest in this asset class (smaller firms in particular who do 
not benefit from economies of scale in real estate investment)4. We further exclude any 
observation for which the sum of reported investments in the disaggregated asset class data 
accounts for less than 60 per cent, or exceeds 105 per cent, of total investment. A further 
problem is that for many German firms, reported investments in bonds are unusually low. We 
believe this is due to the widespread investment by German firms in debt-like instruments 
which are not explicitly counted as debt, such as pfandbriefe (a type of covered bond) and 
other mortgage-backed securities. Hence, to correct for this, for any German firm which is 
missing more than 40 per cent of total investment, we attribute these missing assets to 
pfandbriefe etc. and include these in the bonds category. We feel this is a reasonable 
adjustment to make, as failure to do so leads to an implausibly high weighting in equities for 
German firms of almost 50 per cent. A series of robustness checks confirms that these data-
cleaning measures do not bias the results (see section 4.4 below)5. Post-cleaning, the sample 
includes 2067 observations in total6, which we deem sufficient to obtain an adequate degree 
of estimation efficiency. 
                                               
4 We also retain firms which do not report information on loans or cash, as these are considered minor 
investment categories. 
5 It is also worth noting that the problem of missing investment categories only affects our estimates of portfolio 
risk, for which we require the disaggregated asset class data, whereas portfolio returns data are unaffected as 
these are based on the aggregate investment income/capital gains data which is reported for the entire portfolio 
of assets (see section 3.2 below). 
6 Further data cleaning was required to exclude some observations which misreport units of measurement, and 
elimination of large outliers in the returns and risks data. In total, approximately 40 per cent of observations 
were lost through data-cleaning. 
  
Country Number 
of firms 
Regulatory 
regime 
Limit 
on 
equities 
(per 
cent) 
Actual 
equity 
holdingsa 
(per 
cent) 
Investment 
returns 
(percentage 
points) 
Portfolio 
risk 
(percentage 
points) 
Finland 19 QR 50 17.3 10.2 9.9 
France 50 QR 65 13.4 9.7 4.8 
Germany 134 QR 30 21.1 7.4 6.5 
Italy 39 QR 20 6.0 8.1 4.7 
Netherlands 22 PPR none 15.4 8.8 6.4 
Sweden 19 QR 25 36.3 10.0 10.7 
UK 90 PPR none 35.5 10.7 6.3 
QR countriesb 261 n/a n/a 18.6 8.2 6.5 
PPR countriesb 112 n/a n/a 31.5 10.3 6.3 
Totalb 373 n/a n/a 21.8 8.7 6.5 
a Percentage of total investments. b Unweighted average across all firms. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
We note three points of interest from a preliminary examination of the data. First, average 
portfolio weights in equity investments  are significantly higher in PPR countries compared 
to QR countries. This seems, in part, to be driven by the tight constraints imposed in some 
countries, in particular Germany, who is investing close to her limit7. Second, average 
nominal investment returns are approximately 2 percentage points higher in PPR countries, 
which is consistent with the higher weighting in equities in these countries. Third, their 
superior investment performance does not seem to be driven entirely by more aggressive risk-
                                               
7 It may seem puzzling that Swedish firms actually breach, on average, their QR limit on equity holdings, but 
this is due to the fact that the rules are applied only to assets covering an insurance firm’s technical provisions 
(i.e. liabilities to policyholders). Any “free capital” is not bound by legal constraints and can be invested 
howsoever the firm may wish. 
 taking, as average risk levels are quite similar across PPR and QR regimes. Thus, tentatively, 
the data is supportive of the view that QR countries are holding (relatively) inefficient 
portfolios. Even though PPR countries are investing more heavily in equities and generating 
higher returns, due to the flexibility afforded by their regulatory regimes, they seem more 
able to manage portfolio risk. 
3. Model specification and estimation methods 
3.1 Risk Adjustment 
The standard technique for adjusting returns for risk used widely in the literature is to run 
(multi-factor) Jensen regressions. However, it is not possible to use this approach, due to the 
short length of our time series data (each fund contains only nine annual returns at most). 
Instead, we adjust for risk by estimating Sharpe ratios8 for each fund. Although this is a 
cruder technique of risk-adjustment (in particular because it does not disaggregate between 
systematic (non-diversifiable) risk and idiosyncratic (diversifiable) risk), Sharpe ratios are 
widely used under conditions of limited data availability (Sharpe, 1994). 
Recall that our key objective is to test whether portfolios are less efficient in QR countries 
relative to PPR countries. We show that this is equivalent to testing whether portfolio Sharpe 
ratios are on average lower in QR countries than in PPR countries with reference to Figure 1 
below. Following CAPM, the unconstrained investment manager in the PPR country9 
optimizes by choosing the tangency portfolio of risky assets located at point PPR (assume for 
simplicity net cash holdings are zero). Suppose the manager in the QR country has a risk 
target of σ1, this could be achieved through an efficient portfolio consisting of the same mix 
of risky assets as in the tangency portfolio and an appropriate weight in cash so that she 
moves down the capital market line (CML) to point A. However, the QR country imposes a 
limit on equity investment so that this point cannot be attained and instead the manager must 
choose portfolio QR, which is below the efficient frontier/CML. Note that: 
(QR-RFR)/ σ1 < (A-RFR)/ σ1 = (PPR-RFR)/ σ2 
                                               
8 The Sharpe ratio is defined as excess return (expected return minus the risk-free rate) divided by standard 
deviation of returns. 
9 This result continues to hold if the PPR manager also locates below the efficient frontier. 
 and thus the QR portfolio has a lower Sharpe ratio than the PPR portfolio. It is easily shown 
that the converse also holds, i.e. a lower Sharpe ratio implies a less efficient portfolio. 
 
σ
E(R)
PPR
RFR
Efficiency loss
A
QR
Capital Market Line
σ1 σ2
 
E(R) denotes expected return; σ denotes standard deviation; RFR denotes risk-free rate. 
Figure 1: Sharpe ratios and portfolio efficiency 
3.2 Model specification 
Our model specification is: 
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where rijt denotes nominal investment returns for firm i in country j on date t, fjtr  denotes the 
risk-free interest rate, σijt denotes portfolio risk, sizeijt denotes fund size, mktretsjt denotes 
market returns (adjusted for volatility), and QRj denotes a regulation dummy. ηi and νj denote 
random effects for firm i and country j respectively (included in some specifications). 
 The dependent variable is specified as the per-period Sharpe ratio. Portfolio returns ( ijtr ) 
(defined as post-tax nominal returns, gross of management expenses) are constructed from 
the constituent balance sheet items using the following formula10:  
return = (investment income + net capital gains)/total investment 
It is not possible to estimate portfolio risk by computing the standard deviation of actual 
returns in each fund, given the short length of time series data. Instead, we compute the 
standard deviations and correlations of historical returns on the market indices for equities, 
bonds and real estate11 (cash is assumed to have zero variance and covariance) for each 
country, and estimate the individual portfolio risks by taking a weighted average of the 
market-wide standard deviations, using the standard formula: 
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where E denotes equities, B denotes bonds/loans, P denotes real estate, and αx denotes the 
portfolio weight for asset class x. For the risk-free interest rate, we use the three-month 
LIBOR rate12. All interest rate data is taken from DataStream. 
Regulation variable 
We construct two alternative variables to measure the impact of regulation. The first is a 
simple binary dummy which takes value 0 for PPR countries and 1 for QR countries. 
However, given that there is significant heterogeneity across countries in the severity of the 
restrictions applied, we account for this by also specifying a categorical variable in which 
countries are divided into three groups: PPR, weak QR and strong QR. Strong QR countries 
are defined as those which impose the tightest limits on equity holdings (less than or equal to 
30 per cent), hence this includes Italy, Sweden and Germany (see Table 1). The reason for 
this classification scheme is that we believe that restrictions on equities and foreign assets 
impose the greatest constraints on portfolio efficiency, given that they significantly limit the 
                                               
10 For the denominator, we take the average value of total investments in periods t and t-1, given that we are 
using annual data.  
11 For each country, we use a quarterly time series of market returns over 1980-2006, then annualize the 
estimates in order to be consistent with the firm-level data. 
12 Ideally, one would use the overnight rate, however, over our estimation period the spread between the three 
month and overnight rate is narrow and stable. 
 scope for diversification (see section 1 above for further discussion). But given that 
restrictions on foreign assets are fairly homogeneous across the QR sample, the designation 
of weak as opposed to strong QR depends solely on the limit imposed on equities.  
Control variables 
In order to isolate the effects of regulation and control for other factors which are important 
determinants of fund performance, we include a number of additional explanatory variables 
in the regression equation. First, we need to control for cross-country variation in market 
returns and volatilities. Thus, we include the market returns adjusted for volatility (i.e. the 
market Sharpe ratios) for the equity, bond and real estate markets for the relevant country, 
specified as ( MjtR -
f
jtr )/ j  where 
M
jtR  denotes the market return in country j on date t and j  
denotes the historical market standard deviation. Equity/bond returns are total returns 
including re-invested dividends/coupons. Due to unavailability of data on real estate prices, 
real estate returns are proxied using market returns on real estate investment funds. This is a 
reasonable proxy, given the existence of a strong historical correlation between real estate 
prices and returns on these funds (although note, as a caveat, that Haß et al. (2012) find that 
the volatility of listed real estate indices is much higher than that of direct real estate). All 
market returns data is taken from DataStream13. 
Several empirical studies have also found that fund size can have a significant impact on 
investment performance, hence we also include a control for this, using log of total 
investments (lagged one year). 
3.3 Hypotheses and estimation methods 
We test for evidence that QR regulation leads to lower risk-adjusted returns by testing 
whether the co-efficient on the regulation dummy variable is negative. Formally, we test the 
null H0: λ = 0 against the (two-tailed) alternative H1: λ ≠ 0. We use panel data methods in 
order to test for unobserved firm-specific and country-specific heterogeneity which may be 
correlated with the regressors (fixed effects) and thus lead to biased estimates. This might 
occur, for example, if investment styles differ across countries simply due to a cultural 
                                               
13 For the stock market indices, we use OMX Helsinki (Finland), CAC 40 (France), DAX 30 (Germany), 
MIBTEL (Italy), AEX (Netherlands), OMX Stockholm (Sweden), FTSE 100 (UK). For bond markets we use 
the JP Morgan Government Bond Indices and for real estate we use the FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Investment 
Trusts Indices. 
 aversion to stock market investment, or the existence of home country bias. Fixed effects 
might also arise at the firm level due to variation in investment management objectives, i.e. 
profit-maximizing public companies as opposed to mutually-owned companies. We employ 
the following estimators14: 
(1) Pooled OLS: all parameters are assumed fixed and homogeneous across all firms and 
countries. 
(2) Random Effects GLS (RE): the intercept term is random, i.e. each firm’s intercept is a 
realization from a probability distribution with fixed mean and variance, and distributed 
independently of the regressors; all other parameters are fixed and homogeneous.  
(3) Between Groups (BG): OLS estimation on the group means. 
(4) Hausman-Taylor (H-T): the standard Hausman test for the presence of fixed effects is 
infeasible, given that the regulation variable is time-invariant. More specifically, it is not 
possible to include both fixed effects and time invariant regressors, as this results in failure of 
the full rank condition for the matrix of regressors, i.e. the model is under-identified. Instead, 
we undertake H-T estimation, which enables testing for fixed effects in the presence of time-
invariant regressors (this is a form of two stage least squares, which uses the group means of 
the time-varying exogenous variables as instruments for the time-invariant endogenous 
variables). 
4. Results 
4.1 Main results  
The results provide supportive evidence that the constraints on asset allocation prescribed by 
QR regulation lead to lower risk-adjusted returns. The parameter estimate on the regulation 
variable displays the predicted negative sign in all panel model specifications and is 
statistically significant (at the 1 per cent level in pooled OLS and 5 per cent level in RE 
estimation). We also find that the effects of QR regulation are economically significant, 
leading to a reduction in excess returns per unit risk of 0.15-0.22, holding constant all other 
                                               
14 More sophisticated dynamic panel data models for dealing with endogeneity, such as GMM estimation, were 
deemed unnecessary as our model specification does not include any lagged dependent variables and hence the 
problem of small sample bias does not arise. 
 variables (see Table A1, Appendix A for full estimation results). It is more meaningful to 
express our estimates in terms of nominal returns. To do this, we assume a risk target of 6.5 
percentage points (which is the simply the mean estimated portfolio risk for the whole 
sample), and using the formula for the Sharpe ratio15, we estimate QR regulation leads to a 
reduction in risk-adjusted returns of 1-1.4 percentage points. The higher average investment 
returns in PPR countries are due to higher weighting in equities. However, by adjusting for 
risk, our results show that the outperformance of PPR countries is not driven purely by more 
aggressive risk-taking relative to QR countries, i.e. movement along the efficient frontier, it 
also reflects the inability of QR countries to fully exploit the benefits of portfolio 
diversification, thus resulting in distortion below the efficient frontier. 
Our results on the three-tier regulation index suggest that those countries which impose the 
most stringent constraints tend to experience the largest reduction in risk-adjusted returns. 
The parameter estimate on the weak QR dummy is no longer statistically significant, whereas 
the  strong QR dummy is highly significant and implies a larger reduction in risk-adjusted 
returns of 1.5-2.1 percentage points relative to PPR countries. A Wald test on the restriction 
of homogeneity on the co-efficients on the weak QR and strong QR dummies is firmly 
rejected at the 1 per cent level. These results suggest that it is not just the overall choice of 
QR versus PPR regime that matters, the severity of the restrictions applied makes a difference 
in terms of the efficiency cost in portfolio performance. In weak QR countries (Finland and 
France), the constraints on equity investment are not binding (see Table 1), and hence there 
do not appear to be any significant distortionary impacts on investment decisions or portfolio 
diversification. Note also that despite exhibiting above average returns, French funds have 
rather low risk levels. Hence, it seems that with her very high ceiling on permitted equity 
holdings, France seems to adopt a regulatory approach which resembles more closely a PPR 
than a QR regime. In the remainder of the paper, for brevity, we discuss the estimation results 
for the binary regulation dummy only. 
4.2 Testing for fixed versus random effects 
The parameter estimates remain stable across all panel model specifications, retaining the 
same signs and relatively similar magnitudes. The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test is 
                                               
15 We use the same procedure and the same risk target of 6.5 per cent for converting Sharpe ratio estimates into 
nominal returns throughout the paper. 
 significant at the 1 per cent level, indicating strong evidence of group effects. In order to test 
whether these are fixed or random, we conduct Hausman-Taylor estimation. The first stage in 
the H-T estimation procedure is to estimate fixed effects OLS (dropping the time-invariant 
regulation variable) and conduct the Hausman test to determine which of the regressors are 
exogenous and therefore useful as instruments. The results only indicate that the real estate 
returns variable is endogenous, hence the others are used to instrument the regulation 
variable. The correlations with the regulation variable are sufficient to avoid a weak 
instrument problem. H-T imposes an identification condition that the number of exogenous 
time-varying regressors (size, bond returns and equity returns) must be greater than or equal 
to the number of endogenous time-invariant regressors (regulation), hence this is satisfied. In 
the second stage, following Baltagi et al. (2003), we conduct the Hausman test on random 
effects versus H-T, to detect the presence of fixed effects. Hausman gives a strong rejection 
of RE in favour of H-T (we reject the null of no fixed effects at the 1 per cent significance 
level). Although there is strong evidence of fixed effects, the QR parameter estimate actually 
increases in magnitude and in statistical significance in the H-T estimation. Hence, if 
anything, the presence of fixed effects may lead us to underestimate the true impact of QR 
regulation. 
In order to investigate further what is causing the fixed effects, following on from the above 
discussion that France seems to better fit the pattern of a PPR regime, we re-specify the 
regulation variable to denote France as a PPR country, then repeat the H-T estimation 
procedure. The results show a marked contrast - the Hausman test is no longer significant at 
the 10 per cent level, suggesting that the detection of fixed effects is actually reflecting the 
mis-categorization of France’s regulatory approach, rather than a more pernicious problem of 
omitted variables. Taking these factors into consideration, we choose random effects over 
fixed effects as our preferred estimator, and hence all results which follow pertain to random 
effects GLS (unless otherwise indicated). 
Diagnostics on residuals 
The White test and the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity are both 
significant at the 1 per cent level. The second test is repeated with respect to each of the right-
hand side variables, but it is only significant for log of total investments. This suggests that 
the presence of heteroscedasticity is caused by variation in firm size, rather than a more 
serious problem of omitted variables. There also appears to be evidence of serial correlation - 
 the Wooldridge test for panel autocorrelation is significant at the 1 per cent level. In line with 
standard practice, all standard errors are corrected by using heteroscedasticity-robust standard 
errors throughout. 
4.3 Control Variables 
As we would expect, there is a positive and highly significant relationship between the whole 
of market (equities, bonds and real estate) returns variables and individual fund performance. 
Thus, it proves important to control for cross-country variation in market performance. The 
estimated size co-efficient is negative and economically, but not statistically, significant. This 
result is consistent with findings in several existing empirical studies, e.g. Blake et al. (2002), 
who rationalize this as a “size is an anchor to performance” effect, i.e. large investing 
institutions with a large market share in a given market cannot benefit fully from active 
trading given that trading induces more easily detectable price movements. 
As a robustness check, we extend our somewhat parsimonious model specification to include 
several other regressors which may potentially be important in explaining investment returns. 
The inclusion of these additional controls has very little effect on the estimated regulation co-
efficient (see Table A2, Appendix A - note that the estimation sample size is smaller due to 
data unavailability for some of these variables, but in a comparison of the QR parameter 
estimates with and without the additional controls, based on the same subsample, there is 
very little difference). We include the firm’s capital ratio (defined as share capital divided by 
total assets) as an additional regressor, but this is not statistically significant. Given that there 
may be a problem of endogeneity, i.e. firms investing in riskier assets might choose to hold 
more capital, we also undertake two stage least squares and instrument the capital ratio 
variable using 2 year lagged values. However, the estimated co-efficient is still insignificant, 
suggesting that capital ratios do not have a major impact on fund performance. 
We also attempt to control for fund management skills. There is considerable debate in the 
existing literature on whether or not managerial skill affects fund performance. Several 
papers (e.g. Blake et al., 1999; Ibbotson and Kaplan, 2000) have shown that most of the 
variation in overall investment returns depends not on the selection of individual investments, 
but on the asset allocation strategy (which, arguably, requires less sophisticated skills than 
stock-picking). Rhodes (2000) also finds little evidence of persistence in investment 
performance. Hence, this casts doubt on the extent to which “good” investment managers can 
 consistently outperform “bad” managers. We proxy fund management skills using investment 
management expenses divided by total assets (although the assumption of a correlation 
between management fees and managerial skill remains a questionable one). The estimated 
co-efficient is positive and significant at the 5 per cent level, however this does not 
necessarily suggest that skilled managers have a positive impact on fund performance, over 
and above the higher fees they charge. Hence, as a further check, we re-estimate using 
investment returns net of management expenses in the dependent variable. We find the 
parameter estimate is no longer significant at the 10 per cent level, thus suggesting that 
managerial skill does not affect fund performance taking into account management fees. 
Since we use post-tax data on investment returns, it is possible that some of the variation in 
returns is driven by cross-country differences in tax regimes. Although there exists a degree 
of legislated harmonization in corporate and indirect taxation across EU Member States, there 
is a fairly complex system of capital gains allowances and other exemptions specific to 
insurance firms, which may differ across countries. We attempt to control for differential tax 
treatments using total tax payments divided by total assets as an additional regressor, 
although it needs mentioning that this is an imperfect control, given that it aggregates 
together all taxes (including corporation and sales taxes), and does not separate out tax on 
investment income and capital gains which are more relevant for our purposes. The estimated 
co-efficient is not statistically significant, although our results need to be caveated for the 
above reasons. 
The structure of firms’ liabilities is also important in determining the composition of assets 
held in the investment portfolio. Life insurance firms generally follow a broad strategy of 
asset-liability matching, in which the risk and duration characteristics of liabilities are 
matched against an equivalent composition of assets, in order to immunize the investment 
portfolio against market volatility. Hence, firms holding predominantly fixed nominal 
liabilities will tend to hold a higher proportion of bonds, whereas those whose business mix 
contains more variable liabilities, such as unit-linked and with-profits policies, will tend to 
invest more heavily in equities and real estate. Thus, the structure of liabilities held by a firm 
can impose significant constraints on the possibility of portfolio diversification. However, we 
are unable to control for the composition of firms’ liabilities due to data unavailability, and 
hence our results need to be caveated accordingly. 
 4.4 Other robustness checks 
Missing investment categories 
As previously discussed in section 2 above, we exclude observations with incomplete 
information on investment categories. We check whether our results on the QR estimate are 
robust to this sample selection, by replacing the excluded observations and re-estimating . We 
find that the broad flavor of our results is not affected, the QR estimate remains negative and 
statistically significant, and actually increases in magnitude in the larger sample, although the 
standard errors are a lot larger (see Table A2, Appendix A). We also check whether our 
results are robust to the assumption that missing investments in German firms are due to non-
reporting of Pfandbriefe and other mortgage-backed securities. Dropping these observations 
and re-estimating, the results on the QR estimate are little changed. This series of tests 
corroborates the robustness of our results and indicates that our findings on the effects of QR 
regulation are not due to the exclusion of observations and assumptions on missing 
investment categories we have made. 
Country-specific heterogeneity 
Our concern here is that cross-country variation in the performance of equity markets over 
our estimation period might bias or decrease the efficiency of the QR parameter estimate. 
Thus, we model country-specific heterogeneity in the equity returns variable by undertaking 
Swamy Random Coefficients (RCM) estimation (parameters are assumed to be random, i.e. 
realizations from a probability distribution with fixed mean and variance, and distributed 
independently of the regressors). The restriction of homogeneity of co-efficients is rejected at 
the 1 per cent significance level, indicating strong evidence of country-specific heterogeneity. 
The QR estimate decreases slightly in magnitude, but still indicates a sizeable reduction in 
risk-adjusted returns of 0.9 percentage points (see Table A2, Appendix A). Overall, our 
results are robust to the RCM estimation, but the reduction in the size of the regulation effect 
needs to be taken into consideration, as it suggests that the extent to which the superior 
performance of investment returns in PPR countries is driven by higher weighting in equities 
might have been slightly underestimated. 
We also investigate whether our results are being disproportionately driven by an individual 
country, by dropping each country from the sample in turn and re-estimating. The QR 
estimate remains relatively stable, although there are two interesting cases. First, excluding 
 France from the sample, the estimated impact of QR regulation increases by 0.8 percentage 
points. This is consistent with the previous discussion that, due to her relatively loose 
regulatory constraints, France behaves more like a PPR than a QR country. In contrast, 
excluding Germany from the sample leads to a decrease in the effect of regulation of 0.7 
percentage points. This is consistent with the view that the tightly binding limits imposed in 
Germany lead to a significant cost in terms of portfolio efficiency. 
Testing for structural breaks 
Our main concern here is that a deterioration in market conditions after the 2001 Dotcom 
Bust may have had a significant impact on investment strategy and performance. Indeed, this 
is evident in the raw data, with most countries exhibiting lower investment returns post-2001. 
We conduct a Chow test for a structural break in 2001. A restriction of equality of co-
efficients pre- and post-2001 is firmly rejected at the 1 per cent level, indicating strong 
evidence of a structural break. However, our findings on the negative impact of regulation are 
robust to inclusion of the break, in fact they become stronger - the effect of QR regulation 
increases to 1.9 (pre-2001) and to 2 (post-2001) percentage points (see Table A2, Appendix 
A). Thus, failure to account for this break leads to a problem of misspecification which biases 
downward the magnitude of the QR estimate. The driving force behind this appears to be a 
change in investment behaviour post-2001 in PPR countries. Comparing the data pre-and 
post-2001, we find that although the average weighting in equities is relatively unchanged in 
QR countries (increasing slightly from 18 to 19 per cent), in PPR countries there is a marked 
shift out of equity investment (a reduction from 38 to 22 per cent). This suggests that firms in 
PPR countries responded optimally to the financial market turbulence by restructuring their 
portfolios and shifting decisively out of equities, whereas QR firms’ investment strategies 
were largely unresponsive. This result suggests another drawback of a prescriptive approach 
to regulation, in terms of the inflexibility it imposes on investment strategy. 
Testing for survivorship bias 
Our concern here is that the superior investment performance exhibited in PPR countries 
might in part be reflecting a selection bias in the following sense. It might be that firms in 
these countries are taking greater risks - those which are unlucky become insolvent and drop 
out of the sample, whereas those which are lucky survive, which has the effect of flattering 
the results on overall performance. To test for the presence of this effect, we exclude any firm 
which subsequently exits part way through the estimation period and then re-estimate. If 
 survivorship bias exists, then in the sample which includes these poorly performing firms, the 
QR estimate should be smaller. We find that our results remain robust, the QR estimate does 
not change much and is actually slightly larger in the case which includes these “weaker” 
firms. However, it needs mentioning that this is a rather crude method of testing for 
survivorship bias - data constraints prevent us from undertaking a more sophisticated 
analysis. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we investigate whether asset allocation regulations impose an efficiency cost on 
portfolio performance. Comparing the performance of life insurance funds in countries which 
impose caps on risky asset class investments with those which do not, we find evidence of a 
large and statistically significant impact on portfolio efficiency. Funds which are subject to 
quantitative restrictions experience lower risk-adjusted returns of the magnitude of around 1-
2 percentage points. We formulate a panel data econometric model which explains fund 
Sharpe ratios as a function of the type of regulation applied and a series of control variables. 
Our results are robust to tests for fixed effects and country-specific heterogeneity, and a 
series of other robustness checks. 
Our analysis informs the ongoing debate on reforms to financial regulation, borne out of the 
recent global crisis. Although the benefits of constraining excessive risk-taking activities 
have received much attention, our findings show that there are also potentially large costs. In 
particular, a regulatory approach which imposes explicit limits on holdings in risky asset 
classes can be a quite a blunt instrument, in that it can impede investment managers’ ability 
to exploit the benefits of portfolio diversification and thus distort portfolio choice below the 
efficient frontier. Indeed, it is interesting to note that these concerns have been reflected in 
recent reforms to EU life insurance regulation. In the new regime of prudential regulation 
known as Solvency II, due for implementation in January 2014, the use of quantitative 
restrictions in managing asset risk has been abandoned, in favour of a prudent person 
approach in which insurers are merely required to have adequate systems and controls in 
place to manage these risks. 
Although our analysis focuses on insurance firms, we believe our results have broader 
implications for the current debate on reforms to banking regulation. In particular, a key 
component of the recent formulation for changes to global banking regulation, codified in the 
 Basel III Accords (see Basel Committee, 2010), relates to new policies aimed at bolstering 
regulation of banks’ liquidity risk. In particular, new rules which require that banks hold a 
sufficient stock of “high-quality liquid assets” seem likely to skew asset portfolios towards 
containing a higher proportion of “safe” government bonds than under the previous regime. 
Our analysis indicates that a regulatory approach which emphasizes the liquidity of individual 
assets rather than the benefits of portfolio diversification in minimizing overall price 
volatility can lead to significant efficiency costs in portfolio performance. 
Our results further indicate that those countries which impose the most stringent constraints 
on asset allocation tend to experience the largest reduction in risk-adjusted returns. This part 
of our analysis focuses purely on heterogeneity across countries in restrictions on equity 
holdings, but it is reasonable to believe that similar effects arise with other risky asset classes. 
For instance, it is likely that imposing stringent constraints on foreign asset holdings will 
prevent investment managers from exploiting the benefits of international diversification. A 
ban on investment in derivatives would also likely be counterproductive, in that it prevents 
the use of sound risk management tools in mitigating portfolio risk. But these work strands 
are beyond the scope of the current paper and are left for future research. 
Our analysis also sheds light on other differences between QR and PPR regimes, beyond the 
constraints imposed on portfolio diversification. For example, there may also be costs 
imposed due to the inflexibility associated with QR rules. Market conditions change rapidly. 
Firms subject to prescriptive regulation are less able to respond quickly to such changes, 
compared to firms under a PPR regime which receive no more instruction than to invest 
prudently and hold well-diversified portfolios. We find evidence of this effect by detecting  a 
structural break after the 2001 Dotcom Bust. Firms in PPR countries responded to the 
financial market turbulence by shifting decisively out of equities, whereas QR firms’ 
investment strategies were largely unresponsive. However, a more detailed investigation of 
these issues is beyond the scope of the current paper and is left for future work. 
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 Appendix A 
Table A1: Estimation results of main model specifications 
This table summarizes the results of the pooled OLS, Random Effects (RE) and Between Groups (BG) model estimations. 
The dependent variable is firm-level risk-adjusted returns. Bond, Equity and Real Estate denote the respective country-level 
market returns (adjusted for volatility). Column (1) refers to the specification including the binary regulation dummy, and 
column (2) to the three tier regulation variant. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in brackets. *, ** and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. aIndicates the estimated effect of QR regulation 
(relative to PPR) in terms of risk-adjusted returns (p.p.), assuming a risk target of 6.5 p.p. 
Pooled OLS Random Effects Between Groups Explanatory 
variable 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Constant 0.889*** 
[0.163] 
0.925*** 
[0.163] 
1.096*** 
[0.348] 
1.161*** 
[0.346] 
1.01*** 
[0.287] 
1.07*** 
[0.287] 
Size -0.014 
[0.010] 
-0.016 
[0.010] 
-0.022 
[0.024] 
-0.027 
[0.024] 
-0.027 
[0.019] 
-0.029 
[0.019] 
Bond 0.212*** 
[0.020] 
0.206*** 
[0.020] 
0.215*** 
[0.019] 
0.213*** 
[0.019] 
0.164 
[0.106] 
0.172 
[0.106] 
Equity 0.247*** 
[0.022] 
0.236*** 
[0.021] 
0.233*** 
[0.023] 
0.231*** 
[0.023] 
0.463*** 
[0.090] 
0.438*** 
[0.090] 
Real estate 0.074*** 
[0.017] 
0.053*** 
[0.017] 
0.049*** 
[0.013] 
0.043*** 
[0.013] 
0.331*** 
[0.083] 
0.263*** 
[0.089] 
QR 
R.A.R.a 
-0.154*** 
[0.055]                    
-1.00 
- 
- 
-0.216** 
[0.087]           
-1.40   
- 
- 
-0.158 
[0.097]           
-1.03  
- 
- 
Weak QR 
R.A.R.a 
- 
- 
0.110  
[0.072]   
0.72 
- 
- 
0.100 
[0.130]           
0.65          
- 
- 
0.009 
[0.125]           
0.059   
Strong QR 
R.A.R.a 
- 
- 
-0.231*** 
[0.056]           
-1.50  
- 
- 
-0.327*** 
[0.085]           
-2.13   
- 
- 
-0.243** 
[0.105] 
No. obs. 2067 2067 2067 2067 2067 2067 
Specification Tests (p-values in brackets) 
Breusch-Pagan LM Test for 
Random Effects 
 181.64 
[0.000] 
178.34 
[0.000] 
  
Hausman Test (Random Effects 
vs. Hausman-Taylor) 
- with France as PPR 
 18.37 
[0.003] 
4.34   
[0.502] 
   
 Table A2: Robustness Checks 
This table summarizes the results of various robustness checks. The dependent variable is firm-level risk-adjusted returns. 
Bond, Equity and Real Estate denote the respective country-level market returns (adjusted for volatility). “Additional 
controls” compares the results of the main specification (under data limitations) (1), with that including additional control 
variables (2). “Missing assets” gives the results when firms with missing investment categories are included (1), and when 
German firms assumed to hold pfandbriefe etc. are dropped (2). “RCM” models random coefficients on the equity returns 
variable. “Break” models a structural break in 2001 (QR post-2001 denotes the QR estimate for the post-2001 sample, all 
other estimates refer to the pre-2001 sample). Heteroscedasticity-robust (except for RCM) standard errors are reported in 
brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. aIndicates the estimated effect of 
QR regulation (relative to PPR) in terms of risk-adjusted returns (p.p.), assuming a risk target of 6.5 p.p. 
Additional controls Missing assets RCM Break Explanatory 
variable 
(1) (2) (1) (2)   
Constant 1.528*** 
[0.486] 
1.543*** 
[0.513] 
2.575** 
[1.20] 
0.496 
[0.325] 
1.074*** 
[0.225] 
1.11*** 
[0.327] 
Size -0.043 
[0.032] 
-0.046 
[0.033] 
-0.086 
[0.057] 
0.018 
[0.022] 
-0.025* 
[0.015] 
-0.023 
[0.022] 
Bond 0.237*** 
[0.020] 
0.235*** 
[0.021] 
0.266*** 
[0.049] 
0.201*** 
[0.025] 
0.184*** 
[0.020] 
0.166*** 
[0.018] 
Equity 0.269*** 
[0.030] 
0.271*** 
[0.032] 
0.262** 
[0.108] 
0.339*** 
[0.033] 
0.288*** 
[0.080] 
0.299*** 
[0.046] 
Real estate 0.025 
[0.016] 
0.022 
[0.016] 
0.121 
[0.095] 
0.035 
[0.027] 
0.052*** 
[0.018] 
0.057*** 
[0.014] 
QR 
R.A.R.a 
-0.375*** 
[0.140]                    
-2.44 
-0.384*** 
[0.140]           
-2.50          
-0.797* 
[0.478]           
-5.18   
-0.199** 
[0.099]           
-1.29  
-0.132* 
[0.076]           
-0.86  
-0.298*** 
[0.106]           
-1.94  
QR post-2001 
R.A.R.a 
- - - - - -1.88 
Capital ratio - -0.540 
[0.550] 
- - - - 
Tax rate - 3.151 
[10.39] 
- - - - 
Managerial skill - 11.51** 
[5.629] 
- - - - 
No. obs. 1424 1424 2714 1265 2067 2067 
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